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Introduction 
According to several assessments, climate governance under the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has shifted from using a top-down model to a more 
pragmatic approach in which national and local initiatives as well as public, private, and business 
ones are able to mould the convention.2 This change stems from the failure of predominant climate 
politics in the past, which sought a comprehensive, uniform convention to mitigate climate change. 
In contrast, the new approach seeks to form a legally binding agreement from nationally determined 
contributions at the 2015 COP 21 in Paris. Although the new agreement has been hailed as a pragmatic 
approach that ushers in a new era of climate governance, the way in which national contributions are 
reached nevertheless very much depends on national governments. The Paris Agreement therefore 
highlights issues of integrity and fragmentation in global climate governance by a single regime from 
a new perspective. Indeed, climate governance already involves a mixture of states, international 
organizations (IOs), civil society organizations, businesses, and private actors as well as a variety of 
development policies and market practices; the process also accommodates both multilateral and 
bilateral state relations along with public–private ones. Such a fragmented governance architecture 
raises issues for global attempts to mitigate climate change in that it challenges states’ abilities to 
tackle climate change as a single institution.3  
By extension, the fragmentation of governance raises questions about the relationship of 
governance to the UNFCCC regime. For one, how do different policies and practices in climate 
governance constitute a climate regime and that regime’s integrity? The characteristics of 
fragmentation have been set in relief in the context of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Forest Degradation (REDD),4 the development of which also illustrates the development of the 
UNFCCC climate regime during the post-Copenhagen period up to the consensus that emerged at 
COP 21. 
Secondly, it is justified to ask how bottom-up governance moulds the interpretation of norms and 
rules that regulate climate mitigation? Do local, private, and national practices that are now accepted 
as legitimate create incompatible rules and different interpretations of norms in climate mitigation, 
and will this lead to the disintegration of climate regimes? In the case of REDD+, one such important 
practice is MRV (Measuring, Reporting and Verification), which is already part of common standards 
and procedures among the UNFCCC. Will the bottom-up model change already established common 
standards of MRV? Therefore one of the main issues in this volume – thin or thick governance5 – is 
crucial in this chapter as well. 
In response, the present chapter scrutinizes the multifaceted topic of climate change governance 
1 The author would like to thank Kate Dooley for her insightful and valuable comments and formulations on earlier 
drafts and Rowena Maguire for her suggestions in the final drafts of this article.  
2 Steinar Andresen, “International Climate Negotiations: Top-Down, Bottom-Up or a Combination of Both?,” The 
International Spectator 50 (1) (2015); Gregor Erbach, Negotiating a New UN Climate Agreement: Challenges on the 
Road to Paris, European Parliamentary Research Service, March 2015, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank. 
(accessed 15 December 2015); Oliver Geden, “Pragmatism in Climate Policy”, Project Syndicate, November 23, 2015, 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/paris-climate-change-pragmatic-approach-by-oliver-geden-2015-11. 
(accessed 15 December 2015) 
3 Robert O. Keohane and David G. Victor, “The Regime Complex for Climate Change,” Perspectives on Politics 9 (1) 
(2011), 8; Michael Zürn and Benjamin Faude, “On Fragmentation, Differentiation, and Coordination,” Global 
Environmental Politics 13 (3) (2013). 
4 Harro van Asselt, “Integrating Biodiversity in the Climate Regime’s Forest Rules: Options and Tradeoffs in Greening 
REDD Design,” Review of European Community & International Environmental Law (RECIEL) 20 (2) (2011). 
5 See Hugh Breakey and Tim Cadman in this volume. 
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from the perspective of international society’s fundamental institutions. Understood here in a broad 
sense, institutions constitute established practices in the international community.6 The chapter 
discusses whether global climate change governance is a new practice in international relations or 
should be considered as representing a more limited regime. In comparison to other established 
practices of interaction and cooperation among states, including sovereignty and justice as well as 
procedural practices such as diplomacy, trade, and development assistance, the fragile entrenchment 
of climate change mitigation as an international practice offers a new perspective. Established 
practices have developed into institutions with canonical norms and rules, all of which not only 
inform states’ roles but also private actors, businesses, and individuals’ actions. In that sense, climate 
change governance arguably cannot be deemed a strong institution, despite its incipient 
institutionalization.7 Rather, it is formed by international society’s more established institutions – 
sovereignty, market practices, and development assistance – which the present chapter investigates 
in terms of their influence on efforts to mitigate greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to curb global 
warming and both among multilateral political processes and in national and local implementations. 
Many initiatives nevertheless employ top-down approaches, and this paper does not suggest that 
international institutions constitute local practices only. Rather, it investigates how international 
institutions are shaped by different regional, national, and local practices.  
However, a more limited definition of institution—that is, a rational and purposeful body—refers 
to the area-specific regimes upon which this chapter focuses. In line with this volume’s focus, this 
definition also coincides with regime integrity. Accordingly, integrity more precisely refers to 
consistency or how agents (i.e., UNFCCC members) live according to the regime’s principles.8 The 
climate regime under the UNFCCC represents one such rational institution, which in the present 
context can be termed a secondary institution that has emerged to arrange collective action to mitigate 
climate change. The case of global and local climate change mitigation efforts that is studied here is 
REDD, an initiative designed to curb GHG emissions by way of forest conservation, carbon trade, 
and development assistance.  
At the same time, the regime’s rationality is examined here in the context of more fundamental 
international institutions. Accordingly, established practices of international interaction provide a 
framework that all regime members accept as the way the regime works. The examination of the 
regime in the framework of established practices focuses on context integrity, or integrity among the 
institutions that are fundamental in the climate regime: sovereignty and market and development 
assistance. From this perspective, the issue of the ways in which fundamental institutions influence 
regimes reflects how broadly members share institutions and how similarly institutions understand 
the content and relations among the institutions. If members of international society share numerous 
institutions and an approximately similar understanding of their content, norms, and procedures, then 
governance is deemed ‘thick’, and the regime works harmoniously and effectively. In a situation 
where few common institutions offer basic procedures for interaction, governance is termed ‘thin’, 
regimes form the setting for power struggles, and the regime’s integrity is constantly at risk. The 
                                                          
6 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1977); Barry 
Buzan, From International Society to World Society. English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalization 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kalevi J. Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Changes in 
International Politics (West Nyak: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
7 Robert Falkner, “Global Environmentalism and the Greening of International Society,” International Affairs 88 (3) 
(2012); Eero Palmujoki, “Fragmentation and Diversification of Climate Change Governance in International Society,” 
International Relations 27 (2) (2013); Barry Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations: 
Societal Approach (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014), 161–163. 
8 Hugh Breakey and Tim Cadman, “A Comprehensive Framework for Evaluating the Integrity of the Climate Regime 
Complex,” in Ethical Values and the Integrity of the Climate Change Regime, eds. Hugh Breakey, Vesselin Popovski 
and Rowena Maquire (Surrey: Ashgate, 2015); Hugh Breakey, Tim Cadman, and Charles Sampford, “Conceptualizing 
Personal and Institutional Integrity: The Comprehensive Integrity Framework,” The Ethical Contribution of 
Organizations to Society (14) (2015), 6–8, http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/S1529-2096201500000114001.  
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thinness of governance, not its organizational fragmentation, poses risk to governance’s integrity and 
the regime’s effectiveness. Such concepts of thick and thin governance bear a close affinity with 
Breakey and Cadman’s use of the terms in this volume, though for the observation of the nature of 
governance, the terms lack such sophisticated criteria.9 
 
The Institutions of International Society and Climate Change Regime 
The concept of regime that surfaced in discussions about international relations (IR) in the 1980s was 
designed to round out and bolster rationalist IR theories addressing international cooperation. The 
aim of the concept was to explain how self-interested actors—in a word, states—negotiate the 
problems of collective action posed by increased interstate interaction.10 The mainstream approach, 
which Wendt and Duval (1989) called ‘New Institutionalism’, is based on a choice theoretic approach 
and individual ontology, where the role of regimes is to organize state practices in a given area.11 
Regimes – or institutions – are conscious constructions of the states. Accordingly, regime came to 
describe the tool of a power struggle of a state in an interdependent world. 
Regimes may play some independent role in light of explanations of their functions, according to 
which they reduce uncertainty, facilitate communication, promote learning, and disseminate 
information. In some studies, the political nature of regime is obscured, as regimes are perceived as 
technical mechanisms for solving global problems. However, regime theory has generally turned to 
power-based theories in explaining where the rule of regime originates—that is, if regime works, they 
serve the interests of most powerful, if it does not, or the regime is weak – the interests of most 
powerful are not involved.12 
In the scholarship addressing the institutions of international society, which Wendt and Duval 
(1989) called ‘Old Institutionalism’, the emergence of regimes and international institutions has been 
studied from a rather distinct perspective. Accordingly, international institutions are not based on the 
choices of individual state agents, but are established practices that constitute and enable meaningful 
international interaction.13 The relationship between different international institutions can be 
hierarchical; there are ‘more’ fundamental institutions that make development possible for ‘less’ 
fundamental institutions (regimes). This scholarly discussion, which involves the English School of 
international relations (ES), constructivist-oriented IR scholars, and even traditional IR scholars, has 
not produced any simple explanation for rules set by the most powerful, nor endorsed the view of 
regimes as technical mechanisms in problem solving, but rather focuses on the relationship between 
institutions.14  
A regime’s functional explanation is the same as in mainstream regime theories: regimes have 
emerged in certain areas that call for collective action. The central idea is that fundamental institutions 
                                                          
9 Buzan, From International Society to World Society; cf. Breakey and Cadman in this volume.  
10Andrew Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes. A Reflective Approach,” in Regime Theory and 
International Relations, ed. Volker Rittberger (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Sabine Reinecke, Till Pistorius and 
Michael Prefering “UNFCCC and the REDD+. Partnership from a networked governance perspective,” Environmental 
Science and Policy 35, (2014). 
11 Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall, “Institutions and International Order,” in Global Changes and Theoretical 
Challenges. Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s, eds. Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau (Lexington, 
Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989). 
12 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” International 
Organization 36 (2) (1982); Hurrell, “International Society and the Study of Regimes.” 
13 Wendt and Duvall, “Institutions and International Order.”  
14 Wendt and Duvall, “Institutions and International Order;” Buzan, From International Society to World Society; 
Holsti, Taming the Sovereigns; Falkner, “Global environmentalism and the greening of international society;” Laust 
Schouenborg, “The English School and Institutions. British Institutionalists?,” in Guide to the English School in 
International Studies, eds. Cornelia Navari and Daniel M. Green (Oxford: Willey Blackwell, 2014); Killian Spandler, 
“The political international society: Change in primary and secondary institutions,” Review of International Studies 
41(3) (2015); Cornelia Navari, “Primary and secondary institutions: Quo vadit?,” Cooperation and Conflict 51 (1) 
(2016). 
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of international society constitute international regimes (i.e., secondary institutions) differently. At 
the same time, this does not suggest that institutions define regimes, but that regimes, in order to 
work, derive from the principles, norms, and procedures of institutions. These institutions provide 
broad frames of cooperation, yet not only demarcate its limits, but also enable interaction and 
cooperation.15 
In mainstream IR theories, the struggle for power is arguably a permanent construct that seems 
inevitable. Regime characteristics are thus more static than dynamic, and changes in regimes can be 
explained by changes in the capacities of their members. From the perspective of Old Institutionalism, 
international institutions, by contrast, are dynamic; they arise, evolve, and vanish against the backdrop 
of civilization’s transformations. The content of institutions varies and develops; for example, the 
principle of sovereignty takes on new content in the context of the European Union. By the same 
token, the market as a fundamental institution of international society has persisted since the Cold 
War ended.16 Accordingly, changes in institutions and in their mutual relationships constitute changes 
in regimes. The dynamism of international institutions thus reflects on the dynamism of regimes.  
The power struggle is held in the context of these institutions.17 In certain areas, the bargaining 
takes place in international organizations and regimes, which in turn influence the development and 
change of more fundamental institutions. Therefore, these fundamental institutions not only enable 
specific regimes, but the development of regimes (as a result of political bargaining) leads to changes 
in these fundamental institutions.18      
The question of which institutions are fundamental to international society remains open, even to 
ES scholars, though there is a common understanding that they are established practices of interaction 
between states. Despite a consensus of common practices among members of international society, 
there is no sure agreement about which institutions are fundamental. I am inclined to follow the 
interpretation that stresses their importance in certain contexts. In this paper, I discuss institutions that 
clearly enable the climate change regime. In this sense, institutions are historical constructions, as are 
other conceptual structures of international relations.19  
The climate regime emerged from the call to stop global warming and it is also the original 
rationale for REDD. However, climate mitigation does not restrict all the countries in a similar way 
when its practices have developed in the interplay of more established international institutions. Two 
institutions have stood out since the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
1992: the general principle of sovereignty and justice as an ethical frame of mitigation. Both guided 
the creation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) two years later. 
Sovereignty emphasizes that governments are the only sovereign agents responsible for fulfilling the 
duties that the convention assigns. The ethical frame of justice is reflected in the climate regime by 
the norm of equity. Equity refers to the responsibilities borne by the convention’s different members 
and the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. Justice is a weaker institution than 
sovereignty because some developed countries have reservations about it. In REDD+, justice and 
equity are operationalized by the procedural practices of development assistance. UNCED’s 
important principle, the precautionary principle, is a crucial environmental principle well established 
                                                          
15Wendt and Duvall, “Institutions and International Order;” Buzan, From International Society to World Society; 
Spandler, “The political international society.” 
16 Falkner, “Global environmentalism and the greening of international society,” 519. 
17 Andrew Hurrell, “Power, institutions, and the production of inequality,” in Power in Global Governance, eds. 
Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
18 Wendt and Duvall, “Institutions and International Order.” 
19 Charlotta Friedner Parrat, “Reform of the United Nations. Between Great Power Management and Sovereign 
Equality.” International Studies Association Conference 2015, New Orleans. Paper presented in the panel International 
Organization in the Anarchical Society, February 20, 2015. 
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in international law,20 but it cannot be deemed an institution. In climate change governance, the 
precautionary principle is a contested norm, because it is not completely accepted in actual climate 
mitigation practices by some important UNCED signatories. 21 
Aside from these principles, the UNFCCC negotiations, the Kyoto Protocol, and subsequent 
initiatives have established important practices in climate change mitigation: market practices and 
development assistance. Market practices related first to emissions trading and were originally 
adopted domestically in the United States in order to create voluntary, market-based mechanisms for 
curbing GHG emissions. This idea was later adopted by the Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms 
and became an established practice for curbing GHG emissions among EU members.22 It calls for 
numerous concrete practices and technical standards intended to mitigate climate change.  
Development assistance as a mitigation practice is based on justice and the concept of sustainable 
development. In the Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDMs) were the only way 
to include developing countries in GHG emissions mitigation and emission trading. This partly 
market-based practice enables developed countries to reach emissions targets by helping developing 
countries in their voluntary attempts to curb GHG emissions. However, the CDMs were not exploited 
extensively in the least developed countries, and subsequent Conferences of Parties (COPs) 
introduced new aid-related initiatives to bind developing countries into mitigating climate change as 
well. Common to all was a tendency to deviate from UNFCCC contexts and many actors, 
organizations, and institutions that were traditionally part of developmental cooperation business also 
become active in this field. In this way, the practices of development assistance became part of the 
global climate change regime.  In the Paris Agreement, these three institutions and international 
practices, sovereignty, market and justice through development assistance are even more emphasised 
than before. 
 
Positioning REDD in the Global Climate Change Regime 
International Institutions and the scope of REDD 
The impetus of the REDD initiative was to connect forest conservation to emissions trading and create 
permanent mitigation mechanisms for developing countries with tropical forests. The original idea, 
presented by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica at the COP-11 in Montreal in 2005, consisted of a 
proposal to reduce emissions from tropical deforestation through different financial mechanisms, 
including market-based mechanisms and direct transactions from developed countries to REDD 
target countries. The establishment of national funds to allocate REDD payments was also 
discussed.23 In order to prove that emission reductions are additional, the COP discussions suggest 
using national reference levels defined by international bodies to measure reductions in forest loss 
and to avoid national leakage problems that may occur if the reference level is based on project-
oriented accounting. In COPs that followed, the original proposal was equipped with several 
proposals to the REDD+ initiative that connect first to sustainable forest management (forest 
degradation) and then to development goals for global and local environmental conservation. REDD+ 
                                                          
20 Owen McIntyre and Thomas Mosedal, “The Precautionary Principle as a Norm of Customary International Law,” 
Journal of Environmental Law 9 (2) (1997); Caroline E. Foster, “Precaution, Scientific Development and Scientific 
Uncertainty under the WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures,” RECIEL 18 (1) (2009); Jacqueline 
Peel, “Interpretation and Application of the Precautionary Principle: Australia’s Contribution,” RECIEL 18 (1) (2009). 
21 Falkner, “Global environmentalism and the greening of international society”, 518. 
22 Loren R. Cass, The Failures of American and European Climate Policy: International Norms, Domestic Politics and 
Unachievable Commitments (New York: State University of New York Press, 2006), 174-177. 
23 Charlotte Streck, “Financing REDD+: Matching Needs and Ends,” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 
4 (2012). 
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was adapted to the UNFCCC as a pivotal building block of the post-Kyoto Protocol climate regime.24 
In UNFCCC discussions and pilot projects, however, the idea of market mechanisms has become 
obscured in the preparations of REDD+, while the general principles of financing forest conservation 
have remained undecided. Despite some market-based pilot projects, the majority of funding has thus 
far been donor-based, largely owing to the fact that a great part of funding under the rubric of REDD+ 
has gone to REDD preparedness projects, not to compensations of forest conservation. 
Significant in the present state of affairs is the exceptionally complex process to prepare both the 
climate change regime and potential REDD+ target countries for REDD, the diversification of 
REDD+ beyond the UNFCCC context, the different models for funding, and the different 
organizations’ entry into REDD+. Similarly, if forests are understood as carbon storage, then the 
question may create environmental issues concerning biodiversity, which then creates questions about 
the general regulations of earned carbon assets and new issues of their monitoring.25 
At the organizational level of the UNFCCC process, REDD+’s technical issues and some 
important policy questions were assigned to the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological 
Advice (SBSTA). Proposals and discussions from the SBSTA are important to the development of 
REDD+ practices, as they are part of the bargaining between UNFCCC members. Although no 
decisions have been made based on most of these proposals, they still constitute REDD+ practices. 
These proposals operationalize REDD+ governance according to global climate change governance 
in particular and connect it to international institutions in general. These apparently technical systems, 
such as MRV, have already been applied to working carbon trade schemes (such as the EU’s) and 
have enforced the climate change regime’s integrity. They, nevertheless, ended up being revised in 
the SBSTA discussions about REDD+. 
The issues did not emerge to REDD agenda simultaneously, but evolved during the UNFCCC 
discussions and process after the REDD was put to the UNFCCC agenda in the Montreal COP 2005. 
The examination of the development of REDD+ practices in the present article is based mostly on the 
SBSTA discussion. It should be noted that a remarkable number of concrete REDD practices 
developed in different REDD processes, including the UN REDD, the World Bank’s Forest Carbon 
Partnership Facility (FCPF) programme and different donor governments programmes, which apply 
their own development assistance practices. Various programmes also give rise to a proliferation of 
REDD funding institutions. Although these programmes and their concrete projects, or domestic 
developments in the target REDD countries, are not covered here, they are reflected in the SBSTA 
discussions.   
For countries to be eligible for financial compensation for REDD, forest conservation must 
actually reduce total emissions without creating social harm, including problems for the livelihoods 
of locals and rights of indigenous populations. Simply put, these issues create a complex chain of 
problems that seemed to be difficult to solve separately. At least three chief issues can be identified, 
none of which are simple governance problems, but refer to deeper international institutions—
namely, how funding is managed; on what REDD MRV is based and how it is organized; and how 
forest conservation is organized.  
 
REDD+ practices and International Institutions 
All these issues refer, on the one hand, to the institution of the market and, on the other, to sovereignty 
through states’ authority to manage carbon assets. The third chief issue, how forest governance is 
                                                          
24 Till Pistorius, “From RED to REDD+: The Evolution of a Forest-based Mitigation Approach for Developing 
Countries,” Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability 4 (2012; Constanze Haug and Joyeeta Gupta, “The 
emergence of REDD on the global agenda,” in Climate Change, Forests and REDD: Lessons for Institutional Design 
eds. Joyeeta Gupta, Nicolien van der Grijp and Onno Kuik (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013); Jan Willem den 
Besten, Bas Arts and Patrick Verkooijen, “The Evolution of REDD+: An analysis of discursive-institutional dynamics,” 
Environmental Science and Policy 35 (2014). 
25 Haug and Gupta, “The emergence of REDD on the global agenda.” 
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organized, is addressed to development - both in the distribution of the incomes of conservation as 
well as in the issues of participation in the management of the forest conservation. The discussions 
held by the UNFCCC SBSTA seem to be very technical. In that sense they seem to refer to ‘thin’ 
governance values. However, apparently technical discussions refer to certain practices that are very 
political in nature. They include concrete practices promoted by the states to address the aspects of 
REDD management, such as measuring the change in carbon stock stored in the forest or the 
evaluation of socio-economic impact of forest conservation in mitigation activities. These issues tend 
to lead to ‘thicker’ governance values, including the issues of decision making, participation and local 
and indigenous peoples’ rights.  
For the goal of curbing GHG emissions, target countries need to create credible MRV systems that 
ensure emissions reductions. The systems are apparently technical, but as a last resort, political and 
deeply attached to the international institution of sovereignty. Technical concerns appeared even in 
the first REDD proposal. First, the concept of additionality requires governments to establish national 
baseline rates. Accordingly, a mitigation measure “is additional if anthropogenic emissions of GHGs 
by sources are reduced below those that would occur in the absence of” that measure.26 Here, baseline 
rates refer to the estimated emissions that would occur if no mitigation measures were taken. Second, 
carbon leakage can occur in numerous ways, both among states and domestically. In certain cases, 
leakage occurs among different production sectors of a company operating in two countries with 
contrasting emissions policies. In the case of REDD, the full protection of forests in a certain part of 
a country or district can cause deforestation in another part of the country, for the market demand for 
timber may remain high regardless of protection policies. Third, permanence refers to the fact that 
the emission reductions must be guaranteed to be permanent for a given period of time, especially if 
sold on a carbon market and thereby generating an offset. Therefore carbon trading mechanisms must 
evince an established institutional premise that sustainable mitigation is possible. Finally, efficient 
yet cost-effective monitoring of emissions is necessary for any mitigation process.27 To activate all 
of these aspects, the governments’ administrative capacities should be strengthened, which also 
cements the sovereignty of government.28 
The third issue—that is, how forest conservation is organized—reflects both a country’s 
administrative capacities and governance models offered by IOs. When MRV issues and definitions 
are developed in UNFCCC projects, the development of REDD+ governance models very much 
follows the models already applied in development assistance and sustainable forest management, 
including criteria and indicator (C&I) systems developed in IOs such as in the International Tropical 
Timber Organization. The development practices are consistent with the high level forums between 
donors and developing countries that resulted in a compilation of general practices listed in the Paris 
Declaration in 2005 and subsequently elaborated in the Accra (2008) and Busan (2011) forums.  
The IOs – the WB particularly – have used different assessment tools of governance in guiding 
and reviewing the governance quality of their development projects. These tools have been applied 
in the REDD projects, too. IOs and donors endorse the models that try to realize good governance by 
aiming to consider civil society when making decisions and implementing development projects. The 
models are based on different kinds of stakeholder models first used in business and routinely applied 
in development projects since the 1990s. These civil society engagement models seek to lessen the 
problems of corruption and unworkable administration via the participation of stakeholders and by 
                                                          
26 CDM Rulebook, http://cdmrulebook.org/84. (accessed 12 November 2014); UNFCCC/CCNUCC  Glossary of CDM 
Terms. Version 06.0, CDM Executive Board, EB 66, Report, Anex 63, March 2. 2012. 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/Guidclarif/glos_ CDM.pdf. (accessed 12 November 2014). 
27 UNFCCC, FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1, Conference of Parties, Eleventh Session, Montreal, 28 November to 9 December 
2005, Item 6 of the provisional agenda. 
28 Jacob Phelbs, Edward L.Webb and Arun Agrawal, “Does REDD+ Threaten to Recentralize Forest Governance?,” 
Science 328, 16 April (2010). 
8 
 
 
disseminating information about on-going projects to local beneficiaries.29 The problem, however, is 
that successful development cooperation calls for a sound, functioning relationship between donors 
and governments, and situating civil society actors between donors and governments does not work 
in most cases. The governance issue in REDD+ emerges when many mitigation measures require the 
strengthening of governments, while the IOs development model suggests more power for civil 
society. Substantial issues with structural governance models surface, for example, in different 
conservation models that can vary from partial conservation, which guarantees the economic 
conditions of locals, to fortress conservation, which disallows all exploitation of natural resources by 
local populations.30   
REDD preparedness projects implemented by several IOs, including the UN (UNREDD) and the 
World Bank, show direct concern for the two latter issues, though the idea of the market was 
emphasized in the UNFCCC discussion. The experiences of REDD+ projects and their cooperation 
with REDD+ preparedness projects have not yet elucidated what the funding model of the REDD 
should be, while more established practices of MRV and governance models have already been 
established in REDD governance. Different REDD projects, owing to the procedural governance 
standards of the IOs and donors, may reflect on thick governance values at least in the paper, but at 
national levels their implementation may be different. These experiences reflect back on UNFCCC 
discussions.31 
 
The Evolution of the REDD Practices in the UNFCCC SBSTA Conversations 
When the original RED - Reducing Emissions from Forest Deforestation initiative - focused only on 
deforestation, the monitoring of changes in forest cover was believed to be easily done by GIS 
(Geographic Information System) based on satellite-based remote sensing technologies together with 
ground-truthing.32 However, as it became obvious that forest cover does not indicate the size of the 
carbon stock or that the changes in forest cover do not indicate the changes in the size of emissions, 
forest degradation was added to RED, making it REDD. This made the verification process of the 
forests far more complicated and added sustainable forest management as a crucial part of REDD 
governance. Degradation and its monitoring, including the definition of forest degradation, whether 
this should be defined according to universal or local definitions and whether MRV should be based 
on international or national governance, became a dividing line in the SBSTA in two respects: general 
definitions and global surveillance are the preconditions for any meaningful market-based carbon 
trade system, but they also divide different country groups in the SBSTA. The issue was not 
necessarily a market or non-market based system, but a country’s ability to control its climate policies 
and manage its natural resources.33 When forest cover can be monitored with remote sensing, forest 
degradation with the changes in carbon stocks call for on-the-ground measurements.34 Therefore, the 
question arises: to what extent is this monitoring a national question and to what extent should the 
surveillance be the responsibility of an international body? In REDD, the submissions of the parties 
have not followed the general line between developing and developed and developing countries. In 
fact, the majority of the REDD+ target countries have supported a market-based approach as well as 
universal definitions and common rules.35 Similarly, as shown in Table 1, some developed countries 
                                                          
29 Eero Palmujoki and Pekka Virtanen, “Global, National, or Market? Emerging REDD+ Governance Practices in 
Mozambique and Tanzania,” Global Environmental Politics 16 (1) (2016). 
30 Betsy A. Beymer-Farris and Thomas J. Bassett, “The REDD menace: Resurgent protectionism in Tanzania’s 
mangrove forests,” Global Environmental Change 22 (2012). 
31 Palmujoki and Virtanen, “Global, National, or Market.” 
32 UNFCCC, FCCC/CP/2005/MISC.1. 
33 UNFCCC, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2/Add.1 Views on the range of topics and other relevant information relating 
to reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries. Submissions from the Parties, 3 April 2007. 
34 UNFCCC, Working Paper 1, Background Paper for the Workshop on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation in 
Developing Countries. UNFCCC Secretariat, 17, August 2006. 
35 UNFCCC, FCCC/SBSTA/2007/MISC.2/Add.1. 
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have sympathized with the arguments for country specific deviations and MRV systems.      
Naturally, concrete interests between the countries, surely in the context of international 
institutions, are obvious in the submissions. This is particularly apparent in the way that national 
reference levels (to which the forest conservation measures are compared) are defined. By this, 
different governments argue for justice in REDD governance. The historical baseline (HB) represents 
the average level of historical deforestation that has taken place during the last decades in the country. 
The definition favours emerging countries that have had strong deforestation rates during recent 
decades. The historical adjusted baseline (HAB) tries to correct the distortion that HB creates to those 
countries where the forest cover is high and deforestation rates have been rather low, but which could 
potentially be higher in the future. The project based (PB) reference level allows the most detailed set 
of guidance for creating baselines and focuses on local circumstances, but this is difficult to apply to 
international level carbon trade.36 Although much discussed, these reference levels have not been 
widely bargained, as the UNFCCC has been rather flexible in applying reference levels. 
The emphasis on technical aspects in the implementation of REDD, including general accounting 
systems and the definition of baselines, indicates the aim for a market-based system. Though REDD 
originated partly as a market-based concept to connect developing countries to global emissions 
trading,37 pilot projects have already revealed problems due to price variance in global carbon 
markets.38 Such problems will obstruct longstanding conservation if there is no certainty of income 
for conservation. Though funding is either market or donor based, the target countries must construct 
a system for distributing assets among beneficiaries, which calls for a firm grip and the credible 
governance of governments. Interestingly enough, according to their submissions, the majority of the 
REDD target countries supported a market-based approach that connects their forest carbon stocks to 
the existing global carbon trade schemes. It should be noted, however, that the functioning carbon 
trade in the REDD system is expected to be reached after the different stages of REDD’s development 
with diverse funding instruments. The EU’s REDD has strictly followed the idea that REDD should 
be linked to carbon trade through the market instruments defined by the UNFCCC and not through 
private, national, and regional carbon trade schemes outside the UNFCCC system, which seems to be 
acceptable to most of the governments (see Table 1).   
At the regime level, the problem was how to harmonize the accounting of carbon assets of different 
conservation measures based on different kinds of funding mechanisms. The problem not only dealt 
with REDD but also actualized the importance of REDD as a mitigation measure, which took on 
more weight after the Copenhagen COP 15 in 2009. The issue has been addressed in the UNFCCC 
SBSTA for several years. Since 2012, the discussion has centred on the framework for various 
approaches (FVAs).39 In this context, the starting point is how carbon units created in domestic or 
private systems can be used in compliance with UNFCCC obligations. FVAs do not concern the units 
used exclusively in domestic accounting, but those in international transfers. FVAs include different 
kinds of market mechanisms and partly non-market-based approaches (NMAs). NMAs dealt with by 
SBSTA are accountable for an emissions reduction target of any contributor country and are thereby 
relevant to the limits agreed to in the UNFCCC. Market-based mechanisms include those agreed in 
Kyoto (International Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation, and Clean Development 
                                                          
36 the REDD Desk (2015) Reference levels, http://theredddesk.org/markets-standards/design- features/reference-levels. 
(accessed 15 December 2015) 
37 Chukwumerije Okereke and Kate Dooley, “Principles of justice in proposals and policy approaches to avoided 
deforestation: Towards a post-Kyoto climate agreement,” Global Climate Change 20, (2010), 82-95. 
38 Willy Makundi, “African forests and trees in the global carbon market,” in Climate change and African forest and 
wildlife resources, eds. Emmanuel Chidumayo, David Okali, Goodwin Kowero, and Muhamane Larwanou (Nairobi: 
African Forest Forum, 2011), 194-196; Godwell Nhamo and Alfred Bimha, “Carbon pricing in cap-and –trade systems: 
International perspectives and lessons for Africa,” in Green economy and climate mitigation: Topics of relevance to 
Africa ed. Godwell Nhamo (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2011), 118-123. 
39 UNFCCC, FCCC/CP/2012/L.14/Rev.1, Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term 
Cooperative Action under the Convention. Doha, 26 November to 7 December 2012. 
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Mechanisms) and new market-based mechanisms (NMM) defined in the Durban COP 13 in 2011.  
The SBSTA discussions are included in the Paris Agreement in the article 6. The article uses a 
little bit different vocabulary, instead of FVAs it refers to internationally transferred mitigation 
outcomes, and in Article 6.4. the agreement introduces a new sustainable development mechanisms, 
which has similar content to NMM discussed in the SBSTA without mentioning it in the agreement.40  
The crucial technical issue is double accounting, which can occur for different reasons. For 
example, it can be a result of carbon markets’ having multiple parties, any of which can claim 
reductions in units for itself. Double accounting can also occur when carbon credits are claimed both 
from financial contributions and mitigation purposes, or result from the fact that in combining carbon 
trade with different unit systems, both systems count the same units. The discussion on FVAs 
attempted to solve these problems, but the parties have not been able to reach any concrete solution.41 
The Paris Agreement emphasises that “the use of internationally transferred mitigation outcomes 
towards nationally determined contributions … shall apply robust accounting to ensure, inter alia, the 
avoidance of double counting, consistent with the guidance adopted by the Conference of Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement”.42 According to the Paris agreement, 
specific rules to avoid double accounting will further elaborated in the SBSTA. 
The discussion of the UNFCCC SBSTA highlighted the different interests of country groups and 
their bargaining in the climate change regime. This bargaining and the arguments of the country 
groups followed the lines of international institutions, and as always, there were different grouping-
dependent issues involved. A rough division can be made according to the kind of approaches that 
should be taken under the rubric of FVAs. The EU’s approach was the narrowest; it was ready to 
discuss under FVAs only market mechanisms defined in the UNFCCC (i.e., the Kyoto Protocol and 
COP 13 in Durban). The situation differed with countries that have already used different accounting 
systems than the UNFCCC system—namely, domestic and regional systems, including those used by 
the United States, Japan, and Australia, all of which have advocated for a broader recognition of 
different market-based systems, which has also been included the Paris agreement.43 The broadest 
interpretation of FVAs included developing countries that have adopted REDD+ non-market-based 
systems that did not involve carbon exchange units. The broadest interpretation has been adapted to 
the Paris agreement, when non-market approaches has been included as Article 6.9. Accordingly, 
FVAs, or as the Paris agreement referred them, internationally transferred mitigation units, recognize 
the actions and mechanisms that include net reductions and the avoidance of GHG emissions by 
sources and removal of sinks due to forest conservation. Similarly, a group of developed and 
developing countries, the Environmental Integrity Group, supported a broad approach entailing 
voluntary activities to transfer some GHG emissions reductions to another country, all developed in 
and out of the UNFCCC in the case that they meet commonly defined requirements.44 
There are more detailed proposals for dealing with the rules of measurement and reporting, how 
an independent verification process should proceed, how net emissions reductions are counted, and 
what kind of institutional requirements are needed. As such, discussions in the UNFCCC SBSTA will 
                                                          
40UNFCCC, FCCC/CP2015/L.9 Rev.1. Paris Agreement, Article 6.2 and 6.4. 
41 UNFCCC, FCCC/SBSTA/2015/2 Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice on its forty-
second session, held in Bonn from 1 to 11 June 2015. 
42 Paris Agreement, Article 6.2, see also Article 6.5. 
43 Paris Agreement, Article 6.2. 
44 Environmental Integrity Group (EIG) Liechtenstein, Mexico, Monaco, Republic of Korea, Switzerland. Framework 
for various approaches. SBSTA 39, 09.09.2013, https://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_support/market_and_non-
market_mechanisms/application/pdf/fva_environmental_integrity_group.pdf. (accessed 14 November 2014); 
Submission by Italy and the European Commission on behalf of the European Union and Its Member States, Rome, 29 
September 2014, https://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/application/pdf/it-09-29-fva_eu_submission.pdf. 
(accessed 14 November 2014); UNFCCC. FCCC/SBSTA/2014/INF.13 Report on the in-session expert meeting on 
matters relating to non-market-based approaches to support the implementation of the activities in decision 1/CP.16, 
paragraph 70. Note by the secretariat. 
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most likely continue to follow those issues already set in relief amid different REDD preparedness 
projects carried out in the UNREDD, under the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, 
and in different donors’ projects. Although the issues seem merely technical instead of political, their 
development in several COPs reflects their political nature and indicates how international institutions 
mould regimes via domestic experiences. 
Several emergent issues in the REDD initiative in annual COPs address the influence of domestic 
experiences and practices in REDD+ target countries with the global regime. Owing to different social 
and environmental issues involved in REDD+ and its governance, UNFCCC COPs adopted 
safeguards to prevent environmental and social harms that implementing REDD+ may create. Many 
government and civil society actors have expressed their concern that the new wave of investment 
and competing interests for forest resources brought by REDD will further compromise the rights and 
resources of local communities. Safeguards constitute a mechanism developed by IOs to ensure that 
their investments do not create such negative outcomes. In 2010, parties to the UNFCCC agreed to a 
procedural practice consisting of such safeguards. Known as the Cancun Safeguards, these measures 
define broad criteria and principles intended to help developing countries create and implement their 
own national safeguards that can be used to enhance the role of the central government in the REDD+ 
process45. 
From the perspective of justice, the way in which local communities share costs and benefits 
related to REDD+ projects is critical.46 Although advocates of REDD+ argue that participation in the 
program is likely to strengthen local access and property rights, both of which constitute a key 
institutional requirement for access to REDD+ financing (COP 16, paragraph 72), past experiences 
have shown that administrative frameworks based on civil society engagement models to secure local 
rights are not enough if enforcement mechanisms are weak and subject to manipulation by more 
powerful political and economic elites in development assistance. The creation of safeguards sheds 
light on the workings of international institutions in this particular case. Social issues respecting the 
status of local and indigenous peoples’ socioeconomic conditions and positioning in deciding on 
REDD projects that affect their livelihood were constituted by justice and are established in 
international development assistance practices. The ethical considerations framed by justice suggest 
to thick governance values in REDD projects and may influence the social and political governance 
of REDD target countries.47 
Safeguards represent the system by which donors and REDD countries can verify that 
environmental and social standards are met in REDD projects. They, however, differ from the 
principles, criteria, and indicator (PC&I) systems that private bodies have developed in order to 
guarantee the quality and legitimacy of governance with particular respect to environmental and 
social standards.48 When PC&I systems aim to forge comprehensive governance by controlling 
different phases of production using environmental, social, and economic principles, safeguards 
represent a compromise between national sovereignty (i.e., a government’s control) and international 
monitoring. Safeguards thus play a merely guiding role in national REDD projects. Therefore thick 
governance values which consist the participation of all stakeholders in decision making and in 
benefit sharing seem to drain away in the REDD project routines and represent thin governance values 
at best. At the regime level thin governance values were further emphasised: In SBSTA discussions, 
a general understanding has prevailed regarding the content of safeguards, though disagreement 
persist concerning how they should be connected to the UNFCCC. Although the positions of parties 
                                                          
45 Stephanie Roe, Charlotte Streck, Luke Pritchard and John Costenbader, Safeguards in REDD+ and forest carbon 
standards: A review of social, environmental and procedural concepts and application (Amsterdam: Climate Focus, 
2013). 
46 Rowena Maguire, “Designing REDD+ to be Just: Considerations for a Legally Binding Instrument,” Asian Journal of 
International Law 4 (1) (2014). 
47 Haug and Gupta, “The emergence of REDD on the global agenda,” 89-91. 
48 See Timothy Cadman, Quality and Legitimacy of Global Governance: Case Lessons from Forestry (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 1–24. 
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regarding the safeguards’ information system (SIS) were far from definite, the demarcation represents 
how much guidance remains for (international) UNFCCC bodies as well as national ones. Although 
the majority of parties accept international monitoring, Brazil refused this already in Cancun COP 16 
and has strictly defended her national control over safeguards.49 Following the established decision-
making process of the UNFCCC based on consensus, the Brazilian interpretation clearly survived in 
the Paris agreement. The further discussions in the SBSTA after Paris will deal with on how REDD, 
including safeguards, is included in detailed rules that will be developed to support the Paris 
agreement. 
 
[Insert Table 1. –  here] 
 
Table 1 does not directly reflect the different interests and bargaining positions, as there are several 
items where the countries have not made submissions, although they are known to support a certain 
approach. The table indicates the submission that the states or state groups have presented during the 
development of RED to REDD+. Therefore, for example, all the countries accept the scope of the 
REDD+, although their original submission was more limited. Similarly, although the original 
initiators of RED expressed market-based mechanisms on the basis of funding, they have accepted 
other types of funding, too. Submissions reflect to concrete interests of the governments in REDD 
and when the mitigation efforts threaten their particular interests, sovereignty as a basic institution in 
the UNFCCC process matches them together. In the REDD process, this has meant that most 
important issues concerning funding and accounting are left to the governments. However, the 
emphasis of sovereignty in REDD at the UNFCCC level does not mean that the other institutions are 
without significance in the REDD+ governance practices. The discussions and the submissions of the 
REDD in the UNFCCC reflect back to IOs and donors and to the ways in which they define their 
policy line. Therefore, those aspects on which the UNFCCC has not been able to decide can appear 
in the policies of the IOs and other actors in different REDD+ projects. 
 
Conclusion: International Institutions and the Evolution of REDD Practices 
When examining the experience of the REDD+ process within the new governance model confirmed 
in Paris in December 2015, the present chapter bases its interpretations on the relationship between 
fundamental institutions and REDD+ debates. Different institutions have shaped REDD’s 
development in several ways. Despite broadly accepted objectives for climate mitigation, the basic 
institutions of sovereignty, the market, and justice via procedural practices of development assistance 
determine the borders of REDD governance. Despite UNFCCC members’ broad understanding of 
the concept, the basic institution of sovereignty has yet to be seriously challenged in climate change 
governance. Through development assistance, concepts of both the market and justice have prompted 
unifying practices, and together with environmental norms, they are apparent in REDD’s adoption of 
safeguards from COP meetings. These established practices have quite possibly helped formulate 
REDD+ as well as helped highlight the need to increase context-integrity among UNFCCC members. 
In SBSTA submissions on REDD, this need has been emphasized by the fact that submissions have 
failed to follow any pure division of developed–developing countries. It furthermore suggests that 
climate governance has become thicker, to use the previously defined terminology. 
In the Paris agreement’s finalisation, very few binding rules emphasised the UNFCCC’s diverse 
and even fragmented nature. Due to the role of the regime in reconciling different interests, different 
countries and country groups have congregated around certain institutions and norms: developing 
countries around sovereignty and justice (equity) on the one hand, and developed countries around 
the concepts of the market, justice, and transparency on the other. Although SBSTA discussions about 
REDD have indicated the blurring of such a division, the final preparation of the climate agreement 
                                                          
49 World Resources Institute, Map of SBSTA Submissions: REDD+ Safeguard Information System, WRI Working 
Paper, 2012. 
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illuminates old divisions and points to the thinness of UNFCCC governance as well as more reduced 
consistency-integrity than many SBSTA submissions have indicated. In the SBSTA REDD 
negotiations, such thinness and reduced integrity are apparent in the failure to align domestic 
conservation measures with global carbon markets in a way that is compatible with the UNFCCC and 
can thereby be ruled in official measures toward mitigating GHG emissions. 
In investigating the international climate change regime through the framework of international 
institutions, several issues stand out. The UNFCCC’s drafted governance architecture based on 
UNCED and the Kyoto Protocol follows the idea of a coherent structure for a climate change regime, 
which suggests that the UNFCCC has created a top-down process that is oversimplified and 
unrealistic. Such an approach supposes above all that an intergovernmental climate change regime 
regulates climate policies by way of a hierarchical governance structure. In one respect, agents such 
as the European Union are used to constructing climate policies on that model, though interactions in 
any climate change regime are far more diverse. The Paris agreement is now a more flexible bottom-
up model, quite different from the Kyoto Protocol. Whether the model leads to overall thinness of 
climate governance remains unclear. The SBSTA discussions about REDD+’s MRV apparently 
indicate this. On-going discussion and new proposals reflect the influence of domestic and regional 
practices as well as their own respective debates, all while the climate change regime expands by co-
opting new elements. The regime is transformed via the constitutive role of the same international 
institutions of sovereignty, justice, and the market—all clearly foundational to the Kyoto Protocol—
in other international practices. In the case of REDD in particular, development assistance practices 
are crucial to producing REDD+ governance. In that light, the climate change regime’s development 
not only emphasizes the importance of international institutions, but also indicates how that 
development is a reflection of those institutions, possibly enabling new international institutions to 
develop in an attempt to mitigate climate change.  
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Table 1. Approaches by some countries and country groups toward REDD1 
 Scope Financing Reference level FVA Safeguard SIS 
AOSIS2 REDD F HAB B  
Australia REDD+ MB+FVA PB M International 
Brazil RED F HB  National 
CRFN3 REDD MB+FVA HAB B International 
China REDD+     
Colombia REDD+ F HAB  International 
EU REDD+ ML HAB N International 
India REDD+ MB HB   
Indonesia REDD+ MB+FVA HB B National 
Japan REDD+   M International 
Mexico REDD MB+FVA HAB B International 
New Zealand REDD FVA  M  
Norway REDD+ FVA HAB   
Panama REDD MB HAB  International 
USA REDD+   M  
Note: F=fund; MB=market-based; ML=marked-linked; PB=project based; FVA(B)=broad including Kyoto mechanisms, 
new market-based mechanisms, non-Kyoto marked-based systems and non-market-based approaches; FVA(M)=same as 
previous, but without non-market based approaches FVA(N)=only the Kyoto mechanisms with new market based 
mechanisms. 
 
                                                          
1 The table is compiled from the following sources: The Global Canopy Programme, The Little REDD+ Book, 
www.littleREDDbook.org. (accessed 3 October 2015); World Resources Institute, Map of SBSTA submissions; 
Environmental Integrity Group (EIG); Coalition of Rainforest Nations on Framework for Various Approaches 30 
August 2013, 
https://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/application/pdf/fva_coalition_for_rainforest_nations_1
5092013.pdf. (accessed 14 November 2014); UNFCCC, FCCC/SBSTA/2014/INF.13; Mary Menton, Clare Ferguson, 
Roosa Leimu-Brown, Stephen Leonard, Maria Brockhaus, Amy E Duchelle and Christopher Martius, “Further guidance 
for REDD+ safeguard information systems? An analysis of positions in the UNFCCC negotiations” CIFOR Infobrief, 
99, November 2014; Ministry of Environment, Brazil, Summary of information on how the Cancun safeguards were 
addressed and respected by Brazil throughout the implementation of actions to reduce emissions from deforestation in 
the Amazon biome between 2006 and 2010. Brasilia, DF, May 2015. 
2 Alliance of Small Island States (includes 38 of Carribean, Indian Ocean and Pacific Island States). 
3 Coalition of Rainforest Nations (Bangladesh, Belize, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Dominica, 
Dominican Republic, Fiji, Gabon, Guyana, Honduras, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Republic 
of Congo, Sierra Leone, Uganda). 
